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In the last Survey of Florida Law,' I commented upon how few
Florida Supreme Court cases were decided on the law of negotiable instru-
ments during the two year period. In this survey there are three times as
many - three, in fact - to be considered. At this rate of increase every
two years it may not be too long before we can proudly proclaim that
Florida note holders have become as litigious as those of Louisiana where,
again, over twenty cases were reported in the same interval.
NON-DELIVERY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT AS A DEFENSE
In Johnson v. Smith,2 defendant and another executed a promissory note
payable to plaintiff in the sum of $7,000 in payment for 726 shares of the
capital stock of Southern Insurance, Inc. The note and the stock were
delivered to an escrow agent under an arrangement whereby the makers of
the note were to pay $200 per month for 35 months, at which time the
stock was to be delivered to them. The stock which was being purchased
was thus employed as collateral security for payment of the note (compar-
able to a purchase-money mortgage.)
The note provided that additional security would be furnished on
demand and that on failure to comply with such demand the holder could
immediately declare the entire balance due. The plaintiff accordingly exer-
cised this right to accelerate, after making proper but ineffectual demand for
additional security. The escrow agent then turned over the note and the
stock to the plaintiff, though, as the court noted in its opinion, the escrow
arrangement contained no provision for disposition of the note and stock
in such an eventuality.
In this action on the note defendant's plea of non-delivery was stricken
and the trial judge entered a default judgment for the balance due on the
note, some $1,300. The supreme court reversed on the ground that non-
delivery constituted a good defense to the maker of the note as against
the payee, with the burden of establishing this defense on the maker. The
court then intimated that if defendant successfully sustained this burden,
plaintiff's only recourse would be an action for breach of contract to pur-
chase stock, to which the defendant might or might not have a good
defense.
The holding would appear to be correct so far as the rule of law
announced by the court is concerned. Delivery is essential to the completion
*Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 10 MIAMI L.Q. 372 (1956).
2. 84 So.2d 722 (Fa. 1956).
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of a contract and this contract rule is codified, with respect to an action
between immediate parties, in section 16 of the Negotiable Instrument Law.3
A valid delivery as between prior parties to a negotiable instrument is con-
clusively presumed in favor of a holder in due course. The same section
would place the burden on the maker to prove the defense of non-delivery
to the payee when the payee brings the action.
The outcome in the present case would seem to depend upon whether
the parties contemplated the escrow agent as an agent of the payee auth-
orized to receive delivery for the payee, or as an agent of the maker of the
note to complete delivery to the payee in the future. The facts would appear
to indicate the former, as part of the agent's job was to collect the install-
ment payments and turn them over to the payee of the note. The trial
judge evidently thought this to be the logical interpretation when he entered
judgment for the plaintiff, but the supreme court held that the escrow
arrangement created a transaction tantamount only to an agreement by the
appellee to sell and the appellant to buy the shares of stock.
THE LAW OF AGENCY AS APPLIED TO BILLS AND NOTES
In Betz v. Bank of Miami Beach4 two promissory notes containing the
wording ". . . the undersigned jointly and severally promise to pay to the
Bank of Miami Beach . . ." were signed on three separate lines,-"Corvette
of Miami, Inc." (typewritten) -thcn "Hal Kaye-(Seal)" and-"Howard
Betz-(Seal)." On non-payment summary judgment was entered in favor
of the bank against the three signers and Betz brought this appeal. The
supreme court affirmed the judgment, in effect holding that section 20
of the Negotiable Instruments Law5 would prevent the introduction of parol
evidence to prove that it was not the intention of the parties that Betz be
individually liable. Betz had claimed that he had signed as maker only in
his representative capacity as secretary-treasurer of the corporation and not
individually, but his offer to prove this was disallowed. The court admitted
the apparent harshness of the holding and suggested that Betz should have
sought reformation of the contract, 6 though this could not "assist Betz in
his dilemma" now.
The parol evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction of evi-
dence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which would "vary, alter
or contradict" an unambiguous written contract. The theory is, of course,
that the writing constitutes the best evidence of the true agreement and
should be construed as having merged all previous or contemporary oral
agreements. Like the "Statute for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries,"
the parol evidence rule now and then appears to cause an injustice rather
3. Fra. STAT. § 674.18 (1957).
4. 95 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1957).
5. FLA. STAT. § 674.22 (1957).
6. Valentine v. Hayes, 135 So. 538, 102 Fla. 157 (1931).
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than to prevent it. Thus an authorized agent who inadvertently signed his
own name to a written contract and intended to bind only his principal may
find himself liable thereon if the name of the principal does not appear in
the writing. Even the addition of the word "Agent" to his signature will
not by the weight of authority permit him to avoid personal liability.7
Obviously, such an agent's remedy at law is inadequate and so equity
will provide him some recourse. The usual procedure is for the agent
against whom suit is brought to bring a bill in equity to simultaneously
enjoin the action against him and to reform the written contract to accord
with the true intent of the parties.8 In this bill for reformation the plaintiff
would have the burden of proving, ordinarily, either fraud or a mutual
mistake of fact, a burden which may be most difficult to sustain.
The N.I.L. section 209 provides that: "Where the instrument contains
or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the
instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words
describing him as an agent or as filling a representative character, without
disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability."
In the case being considered the main question, answered in the
negative by the Florida court, is whether the typewritten name "Corvette of
Miami, Inc." constitutes, under the statute, "words indicating that he (appel-
lant) signed for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity."
The general rule under the N.I.L. is that where an authorized agent signs
his own name and does not add to his signature any words indicating that
he is signing in a representative capacity (e.g., "agent" or "as agent"), but
the instrument does set forth the name of a third party, the signer is pre-
sumptively liable personally. However, parol evidence is admissable to show
that such signer was the agent of the party whose name was set forth and
to show that the signer did not intend to bind himself.10 The Florida
Supreme Court would thus seem to be adopting the minority rule in this
decision.
It would be possible to distinguish this Florida case from most of those
supporting the general rule by emphasizing the wording of the notes involved:
" ... the undersigned jointly and severally promise to pay . . ." To permit
the defendant to show, in the face of this wording, that only Corvette of
Miami, Inc. was intended to be bound would be equivalent to complete
avoidance of the parol evidence rule.
7. Norfolk County Trust Co. v. Green, 304 Mass. 406, 24 N.E.2d 12 (1939);
see contra RESTATEMENT, ACENCY § 156 (1933).
8. Eustis Mfg. Co. v. Saco Brick Co., 198 Mass. 212, 84 N.E. 449 (1908).
9. See note 5 supra
10. BaITToN, HANDBOOX ON THE LAW AND NOTES, 785 (1943); Central Bank
of Rochester v. Gleason, 206 App. Div. 28, 200 N.Y.S. 384 (1923); Hoffstaedter v.
Lichtenstein, 203 App. Div. 494, 196 N.Y.S. 577 (1922).
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It was assumed that the note in the instant case was negotiable, although
its language as set forth by the court " . . . the undersigned jointly and
severally promise to pay to the Bank of Miami Beach . . . " omits words of
negotiability. If the words "order" or "bearer" are not included on the face
of the instrument, it ordinarily would not be negotiable under section 1
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.1 If the note were not negotiable the
statute relied upon in the decision would not be pertinent, and a more
liberal interpretation of the parol evidence rule might have been employed
by the court.
EFFECT OF INTENTION OF tIE MAKER OR DRAWER AS TO TIE PAYEE
Florida National Bank at St. Petersburg v. Geer1'2 was a suit by a depositor
against the depository, drawee, bank to force the bank to re-credit the plain-
tiff's account with the amount of a check that, plaintiff alleged, was paid
out under the forged indorsement of the payee. The record indicated plain-
tiff drew the check payable to the order of N. C. Baughman; this was then
endorsed by C. N. Baughman, the son of N. C. Baughmau, and cashed at a
collecting bank. The defendant, drawee bank, later paid the collecting bank
and charged plaintiff depositor's account. The money was used in an unau-
thorized manner and this action ensued. The defendant answered that the
check was actually intended to go to C. N. Baughman, and that lie was
authorized to obtain the proceeds thereof. The bank also maintained that
the plaintiff had erroneously made the check payable to the intended
payee's father, and that since C. N. Baughman was entitled to the money,
its subsequent misappropriation by him was of no concern to the defendant
bank.
The lower court granted a motion to strike all of the answer, except
that portion admitting the bank had cashed the check without the indorse-
ment of the named payee, and entered a summary final decree against the
bank. This holding was reversed with instructions to find for the bank if the
bank could establish that the check was payable to bearer under Florida
Statutes section 674.11 (3) which was interpreted'to read: "The instrument
is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a person whom the
person making it so payable intended should have no interest in the instru-
nent.' 3 The bank would also prevail if it could prove that "the intended
person received the proceeds of the check"; the court furnished numerous
citations in support of this rule. The plaintiff's case depends upon the
establishment of his contention that the check was intentiopally made to the
order of the father because of mistrust of the son, and that only the father
was entitled to receive payment.
11. FLA. STAT. § 674.02 (4) (1957).
12. 96 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1957).
13. BRITTON, HANDBOOK ON THE BILLS AND NOTrs, 700 (1943).
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The question as between the depositor, drawer of the check, and the
drawee, depository bank, is simply whether or not the bank paid according
to the drawer's order. If, in legal effect, the bank is ordered to pay the
bearer of the check the bank has fulfilled its obligation by doing so and a
forged indorsement is of no consequence. If a bank pays out money on the
forged indorsement of the payee's name on a check, the bank is not ordinarily
paying out according to the depositor's order and hence may not debit the
depositor's account. The bank may, however, recover back as money paid out
under mistake of fact from the person to whom payment was made.14 If the
case being discussed is ultimately decided for the plaintiff, the defendant
will be able to recover back from the collecting bank to whom payment
was made.
If the plaintiff intentionally made the check payable to N. C. Baughman
but intended C. N. Baughman to indorse and cash it, then under the usual
construction of N.I.L, section 9 (3)15 the instrument would, as the court
said, be a bearer instrument and the bank would be justified in charging the
drawer's account. This interpretation of the plaintiff's intent would, how-
ever, constitute rather strange and pointless conduct on his part.
The second ruling of the court, to the effect that if the intended person
received the proceeds of the check the bank has performed its duty to the
depositor, would seem to be better adapted to the facts of the case. It could
also have been argued that if, as the bank claimed, the drawer of the check
inadvertently attached the wrong initials to the payee's name the case would
fall under NI.L. section 4316 which reads: "Where the name of a payee
or indorsee is wrongly designated or misspelled, he may indorse the instru-
ment as therein described, adding, if he think fit, his proper signature."
Under this section it is generally held that an indorsement in the true name
of the payee is a valid indorsement. 17 Obviously, if the indorsement was
valid the bank would be entitled to debit the depositor's account for the
amount of the check.
14. Id. at 641.
15. FLA. STAT. § 674.11 (3) (1957); Johnston v. Exchange National Bank of
Tampa, 9 So.2d 810, 152 Fla. 228 (1942); BRITTON, HAwnBooN ON THE LAW OF BILLS
AND NOTEs, 700 (1943).
16. FtA. STAT. § 674.46 (1957).
17. First Nat'l Bank of Hays v. Mense, 10 P. 2d 19, 135 Kan. 143 (1932); First
State Bank of Humbird v. Cox, 213 N.W. 290, 192 Wis. 566 (1927).
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